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in 2011. Whereas the interest burden would have reached 8.7 
percent of GDP by 2020 without the July package, after the 
reduction in EU interest charged and with the PSI arrange-
ments the interest burden in 2020 falls to 5.2 percent of GDP. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge for sustainability will be the 
achievement of a sustained primary fiscal surplus of about 6 
percent of GDP. If instead the primary surplus reached only 
3 percent, there would still be some improvement but the net 
debt to GDP ratio would plateau at about 95 percent of GDP 
by 2015 and after. A much larger privatization program than 
the €50 billion already planned would be one way to secure 
comparable improvement in the debt ratios with less ambi-
tious  primary  surplus  goals.  Crucially,  the  shift  to  10-year 
grace periods and 30-year maturities for EU support, and the 
exchange of the bulk of existing debt owed to private holders 
for 30-year bonds, means that the acute liquidity squeeze that 
otherwise  would  have  occurred  from  prospective  amortiza-
tion will have been greatly alleviated, giving Greece time to 
consolidate solvency.
As of mid-September 2011, there was widespread expec-
tation that Greece would default. For its part, the Economist 
judged that “Greece, which is unambiguously insolvent, ought 
to have a hard but orderly write-down.”1 This view gives inad-
equate attention to the major reduction in the debt burden 
already incorporated in the reduction of interest rates on EU 
support  and  the  major  alleviation  of  the  liquidity  squeeze 
provided  by  the  PSI.  The  results  here  suggest  instead  that 
Greece can manage its sovereign debt under the new package 
so long as it meets the fiscal adjustment targets. So far the 
evidence is that Greek political leaders are willing to take the 
extensive and unpopular measures necessary to do so.
Background 
In  May  2010,  euro  area  authorities  and  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  launched  a  €110  billion  support 
program to enable Greece to overcome its debt crisis, with €80 
billion coming from European governments and €30 billion 
1. “How to Save the Euro,” Economist, September 17, 2011, 11.
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On July 21, 2011, the heads of government of the euro area 
announced a new plan to address the Greek debt crisis. This 
policy  brief  presents  a  simulation  exercise  that  examines 
whether the new arrangements are likely to provide a sustain-
able solution. The analysis focuses on four key measures: gross 
debt relative to GDP; net debt relative to GDP; net interest 
payments relative to GDP; and amortization of medium- and 
long-term debt coming due during the year in question, rela-
tive to GDP. The new Greek package shows prospective future 
progress on all four measures, and Greek debt looks much 
more  sustainable  after  the  package  than  before.  Debt  also 
appears considerably more manageable if the criterion is net 
debt or interest burden rather than gross debt ratio, although 
even for gross debt the ratio is down substantially by 2020. It 
also becomes clear that the major contribution of the private-
sector involvement (PSI) part of the package is in the form of 
sharply cutting amortization due, although by avoiding large 
new borrowing at crisis-level interest rates it also alleviates the 
interest burden that would otherwise occur. 
The debt burden gauged by net debt declines from 121 
percent of GDP in 2012 to 69 percent in 2020, the same ratio 
as that for the United States (federal debt held by the public) NUMBER PB11-15  OCTOBER 2011
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from the IMF. In comparison, outstanding Greek public 
debt at end-2009 was €298 billion. Th  e 2010 package was 
premised on the reestablishment of Greek access to private 
ﬁ  nancial markets by 2012. Greece was supposed to be able to 
borrow on the private markets about €27 billion (medium- 
and long-term) in 2012, €38 billion in 2013, and about €70 
billion annually in 2014–15 (IMF 2011a, 49).
In recent months it became increasingly clear that Greece 
would not be able to return to private markets by 2012. As euro 
area leaders began to consider a second support package, the 
issue of PSI became a source of contention. German and Dutch 
authorities pushed for PSI, but the European Central Bank 
(ECB) strongly opposed any restructuring that could cause 
Greek sovereign debt held by Greek and other European banks 
(as well as by the ECB itself in its Securities Market Program) 
to be considered to be in any form of default. Th  e rating 
agencies indicated that a PSI initiative could cause “selective 
default” even if done on a relatively voluntary basis. In the end, 
the July package included a major private-sector initiative (led 
by the Institute of International Finance). Th   e headline ﬁ  gure 
for PSI was €135 billion over 2011–20 (IIF 2011a). For their 
part, euro area authorities pledged €109 billion in additional 
support (EU Council 2011). Importantly, they also announced 
that the support would be on much more favorable terms than 
previously, with 10-year grace periods on principal and interest 
rates set at the level for the balance of payments facility in the 
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), or about 3.5 percent 
instead of the previously planned rates of about 5 percent in 
2011–14 and about 7 percent by 2016–18.2
KEY ISSUES 
At the outset it is important to recognize certain features of 
the Greek debt problem that should tend to make the debt 
more sustainable than might be thought from a simple focus 
2. Although in March 2011 EU leaders had already agreed to reduce the 
interest rate from 300 basis points above Euribor (400 after 3 years) to 200 
basis points (300), the more substantial reduction in the July package involved 
eliminating any spread and shifting the base rate from Euribor to the EU 
balance of payments facility rate. In this facility, “AAA loan rates obtained 
by the EU on international ﬁ  nancial markets at the moment of fund-raising 
are passed on to the Member States in need without adding any additional 
margin” (EC 2011c).  
on the headline debt-to-GDP ratio. First, there are relatively 
large privatizations planned that should reduce the debt. 
Second, there is a relatively large amount of public ﬁ  nancial 
assets, so the net debt is considerably lower than gross debt. 
Th   ird, the nature of the support program and the PSI initia-
tive causes a misleading buildup in gross debt that is oﬀ  set by a 
corresponding rise in assets. Fourth, the large portion of Greek 
debt that will be held by the oﬃ   cial sector will bear moderate 
interest rates, making the debt burden lighter than might be 
suspected from the debt ratios alone.
For its part, the headline gross debt to GDP ratio is 
certainly daunting. In its July 2011 report on Greece, the IMF 
projected the end-2011 ratio at 166 percent, and the debt to 
GDP ratio was to peak at 172 percent in 2012 before declining 
to 130 percent by 2020 (IMF 2011b, 73). Typically it was the 
sticker-shock value of the 2012 ratio that led many observers 
to conclude that Greece is insolvent rather than illiquid and 
needs major debt forgiveness.
A signiﬁ  cant part of this number, however, is misleading. 
Th   e IMF’s previous report in March 2011 had placed the ratio 
at 153 percent at end-2011 and a peak of 158 percent in 2012 
(IMF 2011a, 49). It turns out that the great bulk of the change 
stemmed from a cryptic category “other” including “recogni-
tion of implicit liabilities” and “bank assistance,” a category 
that amounted to only €4 billion for 2011 in the March report 
but surged to €30 billion in the July report. Th  is increase 
alone amounted to about 10 percent of GDP. In contrast, the 
European Commission’s report, also issued in July, showed a 
lower gross debt/GDP ratio: 157 percent in 2011 and 161 
percent in 2012 (EC 2011a, 29). Th  e  diﬀ  erence is apparently 
mainly the fact that the July IMF report included substantial 
increased borrowing needed to provision Greek banks in light 
of the anticipated selective default associated with the prelimi-
nary views about PSI, an item not included by the European 
Commission. With the July package, the extra amount in 
eﬀ  ect transited to being the amount required for enhancement 
collateral in the PSI bond exchange.
But how should one think about extra borrowing that 
goes into bank recapitalization and, especially, bond enhance-
ment collateral? Surely the state acquires a consequent claim; 
the amount in question is not simply lost. So the severity of 
the debt ratio was exaggerated by a ballooning in the diﬀ  er-
ence between gross and net debt in the July 2011 IMF report 
on the eve of the new Greek package.
More generally, the IMF and European Commission have 
systematically focused on gross debt rather than net debt. In 
contrast, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) has reported ﬁ  gures that show there 
are large state assets that make net debt signiﬁ  cantly smaller 
Greece can manage its sovereign debt 
under the new package so long as it 
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than might be expected. Th   e OECD estimates that at the end 
of 2010 gross public debt was €328 billion on the Maastricht 
basis; general government gross debt was €339 billion and 
general government ﬁ  nancial assets were €76 billion, placing 
net general government debt at €263 billion (OECD 2011). 
With GDP at €230 billion, net debt was lower than gross 
debt by fully 33 percent of GDP. For 2011, the disbursement 
of oﬃ   cial support and corresponding buildup of a reserve 
account to be used for PSI collateral, plus the acquisition 
of assets corresponding to bank support, boosts assets to 45 
percent of GDP, far too much to ignore.
Finally, a central issue for resolving the Greek debt 
problem is that about half of the debt is already owed to 
(mainly) foreign public sectors. A crucial implication is that 
advocates of deep debt forgiveness, such as a 50 percent write-
down on debt, are implicitly arguing either that oﬃ   cial and 
private holders should both take a 50 percent haircut or that 
private holders should be wiped out entirely. Indeed, it is this 
danger of deep private loss because of possible senior status of 
public claims that seems likely to have been active in driving 
spreads to such extreme levels not only in Greece but also in 
other European economies hit by contagion. 
More speciﬁ  cally, the composition of debt is roughly as 
follows. Oﬃ   cial “program” debt (IMF and EU support) stood 
at €31 billion at end-2010 and will stand at €71 billion at 
end-2011. As of mid-June, debt held in purchases by the ECB 
through its Securities Markets Program has been estimated 
by Barclays Capital at €49 billion.3 Greek public-sector funds 
held €30 billion; rest-of-world oﬃ   cial institutions, mainly in 
Asia, €25 billion; and the Greek central bank, €13 billion. 
Th   is places total public-sector holdings at €188 billion (using 
the end-2011 ﬁ  gure for IMF-EU program), or 50.3 percent 
of end-2011 debt. Of the rest, eight Greek banks hold €32 
billion. Th  e half of total debt held by the private sector 
3. “Greek Debt: Everyone’s Problem,” Economist, Economics Free Exchange, 
June 22, 2011.
(including Greek banks) is broadly consistent with the €135 
billion expected in PSI.4
THE SIMULATION FRAMEWORK 
Appendix A sets forth the debt simulation model. Th  e base 
case assumptions for growth, GDP deﬂ  ator price increase, 
primary (noninterest) ﬁ  scal surplus, and privatization amounts 
and timing are the same as those used by the IMF (2011b). 
Th   e pre-package path of debt relative to GDP replicates that 
in the IMF report. For each year, the change in debt equals the 
amount of borrowing needed to ﬁ  nance the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit, minus 
the amount received from privatizations.5 In addition, special 
factors further aﬀ  ect the debt: “debt discovery” in which the 
government oﬃ   cially recognizes previously contingent liabili-
ties; the increase in gross debt associated with borrowing to 
purchase zero-coupon long-term AAA bonds to hold as collat-
eral against debt swapped in the PSI; additional borrowing 
of funds used to recapitalize Greek banks; and the amount 
borrowed for use in buybacks, less the debt extinguished by 
the buybacks. Th  e ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit equals interest paid on debt 
minus the primary surplus. Conservatively, no interest earn-
ings are imputed to ﬁ  nancial assets, although these assets are 
deducted in arriving at net debt. 
 In addition to the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit, gross borrowing must 
further cover amortization coming due. For liquidity 
purposes, the heart of the debt package is to reduce amortiza-
tion coming due in the next few years by carrying out the PSI 
debt exchange and by drawing on oﬃ   cial EU ﬁ  nancing with 
long grace periods instead of new private market ﬁ  nancing. 
For solvency purposes, the heart of the program is to reduce 
the interest burden of the debt by reducing the interest rate 
charged on the EU lending and, for privately held debt, 
avoiding the higher interest rates that would otherwise be 
imposed by new market-based borrowing at panic rates. 
4. Th   e PSI ﬁ  gure refers to maturities coming due from mid-2011 through 
2020. It reﬂ  ects 90 percent participation of eligible debt, so the total eligible 
would be €150 billion. For total long-term public debt, 78 percent comes 
due in mid-2011 through 2020, and 22 percent thereafter (Greek Finance 
Ministry, 2011, 4). Th   is implies that €150 billion coming due through 2020 
would represent €190 billion total outstanding (= 150 x [1 + 22/78]). Th  at 
amount is almost identical to the public-sector holdings enumerated in the 
text, so each constitutes about half of the total.
5. Th   e calculations do not make any reduction in ﬁ  nancial assets as a conse-
quence of privatization. Real estate comprises 70 percent of the privatization 
target, and such nonﬁ  nancial assets are not included in the OECD data on 
government ﬁ  nancial assets. Concessions to infrastructure account for another 
20 percent and similarly are not counted in the ﬁ  nancial assets (IMF 2011b, 
20). 
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RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the central baseline for Greek debt indicators 
through 2020 after the oﬃ   cial support package of July 2011 
(more complete detail is shown in appendix table A.3). Th  e 
principal results are:
  Gross debt peaks at 175 percent of GDP in 2012, then 
falls to 113 percent by 2020.
  Net debt falls from 121 percent of GDP in 2011 to 69 
percent by 2020.
  Purchase of PSI collateral boosts assets from €76 billion 
in 2010 to about €150 billion by 2015.
 Th  e interest burden falls from 7.2 percent of GDP in 
2011 to 5.2 percent by 2020.
  Amortization falls from 12 percent of GDP in 2011 to 
6.5 percent by 2015, 0.5 percent in 2020.
 Th   e primary surplus rises from –0.8 percent of GDP in 
2011 to +6.4 percent by 2014 and after.
 Th  e average interest rate on public debt plateaus in a 
manageable range of about 4.5 percent.
Th   ese paths all suggest sustainability of the debt given the 
oﬃ   cial support, if the ﬁ  scal targets are achieved.
Figure 1 reports the results of eight simulations. Th  e  ﬁ  rst 
is the central expectation for the full Greek package including 
PSI and €20 billion used for debt buybacks (on the chart, 
“central”). Th  is case applies the lower EU interest rates and 
moreover assumes that the ﬁ  rst tranche of EU support (the 
€80 billion agreed in 2010) is converted to repayment with 10 
years grace, similar to the second, €109 billion tranche agreed 
in July 2011. Th  e full amount of the planned PSI is under-
taken, which aﬀ  ects €135 billion in amortization to private 
holders that would otherwise occur from mid-2011 through 
2020, and which includes €13.5 billion in principal reduc-
tion from the “discount bond” menu option in the exchange 
(IIF 2011a).6 For the buybacks, it is assumed that debt can be 
repurchased at 61 percent of face value (EC 2011b).
In this central case for the July 2011 package, the gross debt 
ratio falls from a peak of 175 percent of GDP in 2012 to 113 
percent by 2020, and net debt from a peak of 121 percent in 
2011 to 69 percent by 2020. Net debt by 2020 would thus stand 
at almost the same level as that in the United States in 2011 (69 
percent, debt held by the public; CBO 2011, 14). Th   e ratio of 
interest to GDP is cut to 5.2 percent of GDP by 2020.7 Of the 
total reduction from pre-package baseline in the interest burden, 
by 3.5 percentage points of GDP in 2020, two-thirds comes 
6. In the PSI, maturities are stretched out to 30 years, with two broad options. 
Th  e  ﬁ  rst maintains full principal (par bonds) and establishes interest rates not 
much diﬀ  erent from past levels but far below current market levels (4.5 percent 
for the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years, 5 percent for the next ﬁ  ve years, and then 5.5 percent 
thereafter). Th   e second accepts a 20 percent reduction in principal (discount 
bonds) but in return boosts interest rates moderately above previous contract 
levels (to 6 percent for the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years, 6.5 percent for the next ﬁ  ve years, and 
6.8 percent thereafter). Both types have zero-coupon collateral for principal.
7. Recent calculations by the IIF (2011b) arrive at similar conclusions about 
the impact of the package. Th   e decline in the ratio of net debt to GDP from 
2012 to 2020 in that study is 45 percentage points of GDP, almost the same as 
the 48 percentage point decline in the central case here (ﬁ  gure 1 and table A.3). 
Note, however, that the IIF study does not include the ﬁ  nancial assets reported 
by the OECD in arriving at net debt, so the level of the path of net debt is 
higher. Th   e IIF study ﬁ  nds that the interest burden declines from 7 percent of 
GDP in 2011 to 5.7 percent in 2020, similar to the decline from 7.2 to 5.2 
percent over the same period in the central case examined here.
Table 1     Greek public debt indicators with July 2011 support package (percent and billion euros)
Indicator 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 2020
Gross debt/GDP 143 166 175 169 159 147 131 113
Net debt/GDP 110 121 119 113 102 88 81 69
Interest/GDP 5.5 7.2 7.5 7.6 7.2 6.6 5.9 5.2
Amortization/GDP 12 6.8 7.4 8.9 6.5 2.4 0.5
Primary surplus/GDP –4.9 –0.8 1.5 3.5 6.4 7.7 6.4 6.4
Real growth (percent) –4.4 –3.8 0.6 2.1 2.3 2.7 3 3
Gross debt (bn €) 328 374 399 396 386 370 357 354
Official:  Program* 31 104 160 197 210 199 189 189
Private and other official 297 270 239 199 177 171 167 165
Assets (bn €) 76 101 129 130 140 149 136 139
Privatization (bn €) 0 2.9 7.5 11 13.6 15.1 0 0
GDP (bn €) 230 225 228 235 243 251 273 313
Average interest rate (percent) 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.6
*IMF, EU, EFSFNUMBER PB11-15  OCTOBER 2011
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would be 24.5 percent of GDP in the pre-package baseline, but 
only 8.9 percent in the central case with PSI and buybacks.8 
8. Almost none of the diﬀ  erence comes from shifting to the 10-year grace for 
EU1 amortization, which was to begin mainly in 2015.
from the reduction in the EU interest rates. One-third comes 
from the additional cumulative eﬀ  ect of PSI—which avoids the 
buildup of new private debt taken on at high interest rates—and 
buybacks. Th  e contribution of PSI is even greater in terms of 
ameliorating the liquidity problem. Th   us, in 2014 amortization 
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GDP to 96 percent. Nonetheless, as shown in ﬁ  gure 1 the 
pre-package baseline would have seen much higher interest 
payments by 2020.
Closest to the pre-package baseline, the third simulation 
examines what would have happened if there were no PSI 
(and no buybacks), and the 2010 tranche of EU lending were 
 Th  e second scenario is the old baseline from the IMF 
(2011b) report in July just prior to the new debt package 
(“pre-package”). It shows that even in that baseline, the ratio 
of debt to GDP was projected to decline from a peak of 172 
percent of GDP in 2012 to 130 percent by 2020. Moreover, 
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Figure 1     Alternative paths for Greek public debt (continued)
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increase buybacks (“Half PSI, same BB”), the gross debt ratio 
is somewhat lower than in the central case because there is 
only half as much need for enhancements. Th   e net debt path 
is modestly changed from the central case (about 3 percent 
of GDP higher in 2014, 2 percent by 2017, and 1 percent 
by 2020); and the interest path is notably lower by 2016, 
reﬂ  ecting the fact that more oﬃ   cial funds can be used to 
amortize private debt rather than needing to be set aside to 
purchase enhancement collateral. However, this case shows 
considerably less success in avoiding the amortization spike, as 
amortization reaches 15.4 percent of GDP in 2014 instead of 
8.9 percent in the central package case. 
In the third of these PSI-buyback variants, enhancement 
funds freed up by lesser PSI are used for additional buybacks. 
Th  is case (“Half PSI, more BB”) gives the lowest time path 
of all for the gross debt ratio, net debt ratio, and (by 2016 
and after) the interest/GDP ratio. However, it too involves 
greater exposure to amortization in 2013–14 than the central 
package, albeit not by as wide a margin as the case of half-PSI 
with no additional buybacks.
An important message of the comparisons of the three 
PSI-buyback variants is that the Greek package may be less 
vulnerable to incomplete PSI than might be feared. Essentially, 
if private holders do not sign up for the exchange, the govern-
ment can use more of the oﬃ   cial support to engage in outright 
buybacks rather than needing to set aside as much as planned 
for enhancements for the exchanged bonds. (Th  e enhance-
ments are zero-coupon risk-free bonds that mature in 30 years 
and are held as collateral for the exchanged bonds). Th  ere is 
some risk associated with this outcome in terms of the greater 
near-term amortization, but there are also rewards in terms of 
lower real debt burden.
In the ﬁ  nal variant, the central package applies except that 
Greece does not manage to increase the primary surplus above 
4.5 percent of GDP, where it remains in 2014 and after; in 
addition, only half the PSI target is achieved and the savings 
on collateral are employed in buybacks (“Half PSI, more BB, 
PS4.5”). Even in this case, which allows for some political slip-
page in the ﬁ  scal targets, there is major improvement in the debt 
ratios. Net debt declines from 120 percent of GDP in 2011 to 
81 percent by 2020, a major improvement but not as much 
as in the central case (in which the ratio reaches 69 percent by 
2020). Th   e interest burden is about 0.8 percent of GDP higher 
by 2020 than in the central case but nonetheless is considerably 
lower than at the beginning of the adjustment (falling from 7.2 
percent of GDP in 2011 to 5.9 percent by 2020).  
For sensitivity analysis, it is useful to examine the 
response of the debt indicator paths under alternative assump-
tions about economic performance. Figure 2 reports the 
to retain the original amortization schedule, but nonetheless 
the EU lending terms shifted to the lower interest rates of 
the July 2011 package (“No PSI/BB, old EU1AMZ”). Th  e 
path of interest payments relative to GDP in this path shows 
that a major contribution to lowering the debt burden has 
come from the reduction in the EU interest rates, with the 
interest burden by 2020 falling from 8.7 percent of GDP in 
the pre-package baseline to 6.4 percent as a consequence of 
this change alone. However, without PSI this trajectory would 
have been precarious; the amortization chart shows that large 
amortizations would still have been coming due, especially in 
2012–16.
In the next variant, the ﬁ  rst tranche of EU support is not 
converted to the 10-year grace amortization path applicable 
to the second (“Old EU1AMZ”), but the rest of the July 
package (including PSI and buybacks) applies. Th  e political 
economy of this issue is that the ﬁ  rst tranche was in loans 
from individual governments, whereas the second is from the 
EFSF. Discussions are apparently under way to convert the 
ﬁ  rst tranche maturities, but it is not inconceivable that some 
of the European governments that themselves are beginning 
to feel pressured on their own public debt, notably Italy and 
Spain, might ﬁ  nd it more comfortable to retain their original 
amortization schedules in securing repayment of the ﬁ  rst 
tranche. It is evident in the ﬁ  gure that this variant does not 
make much diﬀ  erence from the central package except in the 
path of amortization beginning in 2015. Th  is variant boosts 
annual amortization by about 5 percent of GDP annually in 
2015–20, implying a corresponding increase in the amount of 
new borrowing from private markets in this period. Ironically, 
by 2015 and after failure to convert the ﬁ  rst tranche of EU 
support to 10-year grace would exert greater pressure on 
liquidity than would failure of PSI to attain more than half 
of its planned amount (see the amortization chart in ﬁ  gure 1). 
Th   e next three variants concern varying levels of PSI and 
buybacks. In the case in which the central package is applied 
but with no buybacks (“No BB”), the gross debt ratio reaches 
more intimidating heights (180 percent in 2013) before 
falling and remains about 10 percent of GDP above the corre-
sponding path for the central case in 2014–18 and 8 percent 
by 2020. Th   e paths are also higher, but not by as much, for net 
debt (by about 5 percent of GDP over 2014–20); and interest 
payments are also higher (by about 0.3 percent of GDP over 
2014–20). With no buybacks, there is no early extinction of 
debt (except for the “discount bond” part of the PSI), but 
there is a larger buildup in a reserve account that deducts from 
gross debt in arriving at net debt. 
If only half the participation is expected in the PSI debt 
exchange, and the savings on enhancements are not used to NUMBER PB11-15  OCTOBER 2011
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2012, 2.1 percent in 2013, 2.3 percent in 2014, 2.7 percent 
in 2015, 2.9 percent in 2016, and 3 percent thereafter. Th  e 
primary surplus is set at –0.8 percent of GDP in 2011, 1.5 
percent in 2012, 3.5 percent in 2013, 6.4 percent in 2015, 
consequences of changing the central Greek package case 
by increasing or decreasing the assumed growth rate, and 
increasing or decreasing the primary surplus. In the central 
case, real growth is set at –3.8 percent in 2011, 0.6 percent in 
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of GDP, from baseline, each year. Th  e low primary surplus 
(LPS) reduces the primary surplus from baseline by 1 percent of 
GDP each year. As a sort of stress test, another alternative sets 
a ceiling of 3 percent of GDP on the primary surplus, aﬀ  ecting 
the outcome for 2013 and after (PS3).
Th  e swing in growth makes considerable diﬀ  erence over 
the decade. With high growth, the ratio of gross debt to GDP 
falls to about 100 percent by 2020; net debt falls to about 60 
percent, and the interest burden by 2020 falls to 4.5 percent of 
GDP rather than 5.2 percent in the central case. Th   e low growth 
case is approximately the mirror image, leaving net debt about 
10 percent of GDP higher than the central case rather than 10 
percent lower, by 2020, and boosting the interest burden to 6 
percent of GDP. Th  e  eﬀ  ect of a primary surplus higher or lower 
than the central case by 1 percent of GDP annually turns out to 
have a nearly identical eﬀ  ect on net debt relative to GDP as the 
eﬀ  ect of growth that is higher or lower by 1 percent. Similarly, 
the interest burden indicator shows an almost identical increase 
from the central case if the primary surplus is lower by 1 percent 
of GDP or the growth rate is lower by 1 percent. Th  e  interest 
burden reduction against the central case is somewhat greater 
in the high growth case than in the high primary surplus case, 
however, so at the margin boosting growth by 1 percent of GDP 
shows up in a greater reduction in the interest burden than does 
boosting the primary surplus by 1 percent of GDP.
7.7 percent in 2016, and 6.4 percent thereafter. Th   ese are the 
baseline assumptions in IMF (2011b).
By mid-September 2011 it was becoming evident that the 
growth projections for 2011 were overly optimistic. Th  us,  in 
its September World Economic Outlook the IMF downgraded 
the growth outlook to –5 percent in 2011, –2 percent in 2012, 
1.5 percent in 2013, 2.3 percent in 2014, 3 percent in 2015, 
and 3.3 percent in 2016, placing real GDP by 2016 4 percent 
below the earlier projection (IMF 2011e). Th  is outcome 
would not aﬀ  ect the debt and interest to GDP ratios by much, 
leaving the main conclusions unchanged so long as the Greek 
authorities took additional ﬁ  scal measures as needed to oﬀ  set 
ﬁ  scal erosion from the slower growth. It is a fair question to 
ask whether the baseline growth rates can be realized without 
exchange rate ﬂ  exibility to improve competitiveness (because 
of euro membership). However, the average growth projected 
in the IMF program baseline, 2¾ percent annually in 2013–
20, seems already conservative when compared to actual 
growth achieved over a comparable number of years before the 
crisis: 4¼ percent annually in 2000–07 (IMF 2011b, 2011e). 
In the variants shown in ﬁ   gure 2, high growth (HG) 
applies an extra percentage point real GDP growth in each year, 
2011–20. Conversely, low growth (LG) reduces the growth rate 
path from baseline by 1 percentage point each year. Th  e high 
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Figure 2     Impact of alternative growth and primary surplus assumptions (continued)
  Central        HG        LG        HPS
  LPS        PS3
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A key to the consolidation of solvency is the achievement 
of a relatively high primary surplus, which plateaus at 6.4 
percent of GDP in 2016–20. In comparison, for the decade 
2006–16 the three highest-surplus major economies will have 
sustained average primary surpluses of 3.8 percent of GDP for 
Korea, 3.3 percent for Singapore, and 3.0 percent for Brazil 
(IMF 2011c, 124). In contrast, the G-20 average for 2006–07 
and 2012–16 (to omit the crisis and its early aftermath) will 
amount to −0.5 percent. A primary surplus target of about 6 
percent of GDP is thus ambitious. At the same time, primary 
government spending starts at a moderately high base, at 
an average of almost 46 percent of GDP in 2009–10 (IMF 
2011b, 73) compared with about 42 percent for the G-7 (IMF 
2011c, 123–25), suggesting scope for cutbacks.
A powerful means of reducing the needed primary 
surplus would be to escalate sharply the program of priva-
tizations and use the proceeds for buybacks. Some accounts 
place state assets capable of being privatized at as high as €300 
billion.11 Suppose that the privatization target were doubled 
from €50 billion to €100 billion. Suppose that debt could be 
practicality more than any underlying economic sense of debt burden and is 
particularly misleading for countries that have large assets relative to debt. For 
example, Norway has gross public debt of 54 percent, seemingly threaten-
ing to violate the Maastricht ceiling. However, its assets are 210 percent of 
GDP, placing its net debt at –156 percent of GDP (IMF 2011d). Net debt 
stabilizes at a ratio to GDP that equals the ratio of the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit to the 
nominal growth rate. (Th   e marginal debt ratio has as its numerator the deﬁ  cit 
percent multiplied by GDP, or change in net debt, and as its denominator 
the nominal growth rate multiplied by GDP, or change in GDP. Cancelling, 
the marginal debt ratio equals the deﬁ  cit as a percent of GDP divided by the 
nominal growth rate. When this marginal ratio equals the average ratio the 
debt to GDP ratio is constant.) With real growth of 3 percent and inﬂ  ation of 
2 percent, a 60 percent of GDP target for net debt would be consistent with a 
ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit of 3 percent of GDP. With the interest rate at 5 percent (3 percent 
real), the deﬁ  cit would be wholly comprised of net interest payments; the 
primary surplus would be zero. It seems unlikely that the Maastricht architects 
sought more stringent ﬁ  scal outcomes than this, even though the use of the 
gross rather than net concept is indeed more stringent.
11. ECB member Juergen Stark indicated this number to the German newspa-
per Welt am Sonntag; Reuters, May 28, 2011.
In contrast to the steady improvement in the debt indica-
tors under the central and principal alternative cases, there is 
considerably less improvement over time in the stress test in 
which the primary surplus never exceeds 3 percent of GDP 
(PS3). Instead of declining to 69 percent of GDP by 2020 
(central case), net debt stabilizes at about 95 percent of GDP 
by 2015 and after. One important reason the net debt ratio is 
falling from 2012 to 2015 despite lower primary surpluses in 
those years is that there are relatively large privatizations in that 
period. In contrast, by 2016 and after the projections do not 
include any further privatization receipts. Similarly, the interest 
burden hovers at about 6.75 percent in 2017–20 instead of 
persistently declining to 5.2 percent of GDP in this case.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Under the central assumptions of the debt projections, Greece 
should be able to reestablish conﬁ  dence in its solvency, thanks 
to generous oﬃ   cial support in providing lower interest rates 
and liquidity as well as a large, if somewhat expensive, PSI 
eﬀ  ort.9 Th  e terms of the PSI seem appropriately consistent 
with the goal of conducting the exchange on a voluntary 
basis while at the same time achieving a high participation 
for the relevant debt (90 percent; IIF 2011a). Th  e net debt 
to GDP ratio of 69 percent by 2020 would compare favor-
ably with the G-7 average of 73 percent in 2010 and would 
be more favorable than the G-7 current policy baseline of 91 
percent by 2016 (IMF 2011c, 138). Despite the exaggera-
tion by the enhancements, even the gross debt ratio of 113 
percent by 2020 would be lower than the 2016 G-7 average 
of 122 percent. Th   ese comparisons also suggest that it would 
be misleading to declare insolvency because Greece is not back 
to a Maastricht 60 percent debt ratio by 2020 (although it 
comes surprisingly close on what is arguably the more proper 
concept, net debt).10
9. In contrast, Darvas, Pisani-Ferry, and Sapir (2011) concluded that public 
debt needs 30 percent forgiveness in order for Greece to return to a debt to 
GDP ratio of 60 percent by 2034, their criterion for solvency. Th  is  conclusion 
is based on the calculation that under optimistic growth assumptions, it would 
require a primary surplus sustained at 8.4 percent for 2015 and after, and 
the required level would be 14.5 percent under more cautious assumptions, 
to reach the 2034 target without forgiveness. However, as suggested below, 
net rather than gross debt is probably the more appropriate concept for a 60 
percent target, and on this criterion the central projections of the present study 
show near-success already by 2020. Moreover, their projections did not take 
account of the larger volume of EU support and lower interest rates decided in 
the July package subsequent to their study nor the debt exchanges under the 
PSI and the prospective buybacks. Nor do their estimates take account of large 
privatizations planned. 
10. Th   us, if there are gross assets that equal gross debt, there is no debt burden 
whatsoever, so long as the interest rate on assets is no lower than that on 
debt. Th   e Maastricht use of gross debt seems to reﬂ  ect political and statistical 
Under the central assumptions of the 
debt projections, Greece should be 
able to reestablish confidence in its 
solvency, thanks to generous official 
support in providing lower interest 
rates and liquidity as well as a large, 
if somewhat expensive, PSI effort.NUMBER PB11-15  OCTOBER 2011
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repurchased at an average price of 66 cents on the euro, so 
the extra €50 billion could be used to retire €75 billion in 
debt. Applying an interest rate of 5 percent, the result would 
be to cut the interest burden by €3.75 billion annually, or 1.5 
percent of 2015 GDP. Th   e primary surplus target could then 
be cut from 6.4 percent of GDP to 4.9 percent. Th  e target 
could be cut further to 4.4 percent if in addition the combina-
tion of less debt exchange and more buybacks discussed above 
were pursued (ﬁ  gure 1).
For purposes of European debt policy in the near term, 
the broad implication of the estimates here is that the package 
agreed for Greece has a suﬃ   cient chance of succeeding and 
validating Greek solvency that it would be at the least highly 
premature to declare it a failure and call for a new, more radical 
program of debt forgiveness. Instead, the most prominent 
debt policy issues facing European economic authorities over 
the coming several months would seem to be how to go well 
beyond the Greek package in order to stem further contagion 
of the debt problem, especially to Spain and Italy.
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(A.4) as either zero or the excess of the gap over the amount of 
the reserve fund at the end of the prior year. Th   at is, if the gap 
is less than the reserve fund available to be drawn down, there 
is no need for new private borrowing. If the gap is greater, then 
the amount of new borrowing from private sources is the excess 
of the gap over what is available in the reserve fund.
ܤܲܰ௧ ൌ    ሼ Ͳ ǡܩ ܣ ܲ ௧ െܴ ܧ ܨ ௧ିଵሽ (A.4)
Correspondingly, the amount left in the reserve fund at the 
end of the year equals the amount in the previous year plus 
the change in the reserve fund. When there is a positive gap 
(oﬃ   cial borrowing smaller than total borrowing need), then 
if this gap exceeds what was available at the end of the prior 
year the new level of the reserve fund will be zero. If the gap 
is smaller than what was available, the new level of the reserve 
fund will be the excess of what was available in the reserve fund 
over what is needed to ﬁ  ll the gap. In years in which oﬃ   cial 
borrowing exceeds the total borrowing requirement, the gap is 
negative, and the reserve fund builds up by the absolute value 
of this negative gap. Equation (A.5) generates this behavior in 
the reserve fund.
ܴܧܨ௧ ൌ    ሼ Ͳ ǡܴ ܧ ܨ ௧ିଵ െܩ ܣ ܲ ௧ሽ (A.5)
In accounting relationships, total debt is the sum of debt 
types (IMF, EU1 from the 2010 program, EU2 from the EFSF 
in the July 2011 program, old private and other oﬃ   cial debt 
unrestructured, restructured private debt, and new private 
debt). Financial assets K begin with the €76 billion reported 
by the OECD and add any amount of public recapitalization 
of the banks, BR. For purposes of conservative estimation, it is 
assumed that there are no interest earnings on ﬁ  nancial assets 
(as distinct from the reserve fund, which is posited to earn 3 
percent). Another non-interest-earning asset is the amount 
of the zero-coupon collateral bonds acquired to back the PSI 
conversion. Net debt then equals gross debt minus the ﬁ  nan-
cial assets, enhancement amount, and reserve fund (equation 
A.6). (Th   e stock of enhancement assets is the cumulative sum 
of annual purchases, although the bulk is acquired in the ﬁ  rst 
year, 2012.)
ܦ௧ ൌ෍ܦ ௜ǡ௧Ǣܭ ௧ ൌܭ ௧ିଵ ൅ܤ ܴ ௧Ǣܰܦ௧ ൌܦ ௧ െܭ ௧ െ
௜
 
ܧܰܪܵ௧ െܴ ܧ ܨ ௧ (A.6)
Table A.2 reports the estimates of this model for the pre-
package baseline identiﬁ  ed by the IMF in its July report. Because 
the package made major changes, the principal purpose of this 
table is to conﬁ  rm consistency of the main simulations with the 
IMF framework and data. Th   e four summary debt burden and 
APPENDIX A     
THE DEBT SIMULATION MODEL
Table A.1 and equations (A.1) through (A.6) report the main 
structure of the European Debt Simulation Model for Greece 
(EDSM-GR). 
ܦܧܨ௧ ൌܫ ܰ ܶ ௧ െܲ ܵ ௧ ൌ෍ݎ ௜ܦ௜ǡ௧ିଵ
௜
െߨ ௧ܻ ௧ (A.1)
Equation (A.1) states that the ﬁ  scal  deﬁ   cit equals net 
interest payments minus the primary surplus. Interest payments 
are the sum of this year’s interest rate for the category in question, 
multiplied by the debt outstanding in that category at the end 
of the previous year. Th   e primary surplus is the product of GDP 
and the planned target primary surplus as a percent of GDP, π. 
Th   ere is a negative interest payment entry for interest earnings 
on a reserve fund that builds up as oﬃ   cial support arrives in 
advance of its use for amortization, purchase of enhancements, 
bank capitalization, or buybacks. Th  e interest rate earned on 
the reserve fund is set conservatively at 3 percent. Note also that 
ﬁ  nancial assets are treated even more conservatively as having 
no interest earnings at all. Th  is category includes the initial 
(2010) 33 percent of GDP reported by the OECD as ﬁ  nancial 
assets, as well as subsequent increases from government funds 
used in recapitalizing banks.
ܤܩ௧ ൌܦ ܧ ܨ ௧ െܲ ܸ ܼ ௧ ൅ܣ ܯ ܼ ௧ ൅ܦ ܦ ௧ ൅ܤ ܴ ௧ ൅
ܧܰܪܲ௧ ൅ܤ ܤ ܲ ௧ (A.2)
Equation (A.2) identiﬁ  es the gross borrowing requirement. 
Borrowing is needed to cover the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit, amortization of 
debt, newly “discovered” debt such as outright recognition of 
previously contingent liabilities, amounts for bank recapitaliza-
tion, the amount to be used in the purchase of zero-coupon AAA 
bonds for “enhancement” collateral backing new debt exchanged 
for old debt in the PSI program, and the amount to be spent on 
repurchasing outstanding debt in the buyback program. Against 
these requirements, there is a reduction in borrowing needs asso-
ciated with receipts from the privatization program.
ܩܣܲ௧ ൌܤ ܩ ௧ െܤ ܱ ௧ (A.3)
Equation (A.3) identiﬁ   es the gross borrowing “gap” 
between gross borrowing requirements and gross borrowing 
from oﬃ     cial sources (IMF and European Union). Th  is gap 
can be ﬁ  lled in one of two ways, or in a combination of them: 
(a) new borrowing from private sources; (b) drawdown of any 
amounts available in a reserve fund that may have been built 
up when oﬃ   cial ﬁ  nancing for the year in question exceeded 
borrowing requirements. It turns out that the resulting amount 
of new private borrowing needed is that shown in equation NUMBER PB11-15  OCTOBER 2011
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Th   e amount needed in new borrowing from private markets 
is then obtained in the next section of the table, as the diﬀ  er-
ence between the gross borrowing requirement and gross oﬃ   cial 
disbursements (IMF, EU1 as ﬁ  rst tranche of EU support, EU2 
as second tranche). New borrowing from private markets would 
need to have escalated rapidly after 2013, reaching about €65 
billion annually by 2017–18.
Th   e next section of the table reports corresponding paths 
of debt by category. Interest rates applicable to each category 
are then shown. Interest payments equal the interest rate for the 
year multiplied by the stock of debt at the end of the preceding 
year, for the category in question.13 Finally, the table reports the 
baseline assumptions on real growth, inﬂ  ation, and the primary 
surplus as a percent of GDP.
Table A.3 shows the same projections in the central, post-
package scenario. Amortization is now set at zero for the two EU 
support programs, assuming 10-year grace for both. For other 
oﬃ   cial and private debt, 62 percent is assumed to be converted 
in the PSI program, generating the reduction in amortization 
otherwise due amounting to €135 billion through 2020 (IIF 
2011a). On this restructured debt there is no amortization, 
because the debt is converted to 30-year maturities. Gross 
borrowing now requires amounts for enhancement purchases, 
however, and also for any buybacks carried out in the year.
Given the oﬃ   cial (IMF and EU) disbursements in compar-
ison with the gross borrowing requirement, there is an excess of 
available funds amounting to €10 billion in 2011 that goes into 
a reserve fund that is subsequently drawn down. Th  is reserve 
fund earns interest at 3 percent. Debt by category is now shown 
with detail for the restructured debt components. 
Table A.3 reports the new interest rates by category. For the 
European Union, the rate is set at the 10-year German Bund 
rate plus 30 basis points, with the yearly rates (based on private-
sector consensus forecasts) weighted by shares in the schedule 
of disbursements. For the components of the PSI package, the 
par bonds pay 4 percent initially and then 4.5 percent; the 
discount bonds, about 6 percent (but on a principal that has 
been reduced by 20 percent). Th   e indirect interest costs include 
the interest the Greek government pays on the enhancements. 
With about €34 billion (initially) in enhancements, and a rate 
of about 4 percent on the EU support, this indirect interest cost 
is €1.4 billion per year. When this amount is added to direct 
interest payments of about €6.9 billion annually on the restruc-
tured debt, the total interest amounts to €8.2 billion annually. 
Th   e direct and indirect interest costs thus translate to an eﬀ  ec-
tive rate of 5.8 percent on the total stock of €141.5 billion in 
restructured debt. 
13. For IMF loans, interest rates are 3.8 percent in 2012–14 and 3.5 percent 
in 2015–18; calculated from IMF (2011b, 65).
liquidity indicators appear in the initial section of the table. In 
the pre-package baseline, gross debt relative to GDP would have 
risen to a peak of 172 percent in 2012 and then declined gradu-
ally to 130 percent by 2020. Th  e table shows that the model 
baseline almost exactly replicates that of the July IMF report. 
Importantly, the IMF did not report the concept of net debt, 
nor did it mention the sizable ﬁ  nancial assets of the govern-
ment. Th  e pre-package baseline would have meant a peak of 
about 126 percent of GDP in 2012 for net debt, which then 
would have declined to 96 percent by 2020.
Th  e next block of entries in the table shows the compo-
nents of the borrowing requirement. It can be seen that the 
net borrowing requirement before amortization was relatively 
modest, a cumulative total of about €80 billion over the decade. 
In contrast, gross borrowing needs including the amount needed 
to roll over amortization were much larger. Amortization would 
have been on the order of €50 billion to €55 billion annually 
in 2014–18, and even higher thereafter. Th   e schedule for amor-
tization of existing private debt would have been about €35 
billion annually in 2012–13, and €50 billion by 2014. Th  ese 
amortization estimates are from the total reported by the Greek 
Finance Ministry (2011) after deducting the amortization due 
on oﬃ   cial support from the IMF and European Union in the 
2010 round of lending.12
12. Amortization and new private borrowing exclude short-term, €6.2 billion 
rolled over annually in 2012 and thereafter.
Table A.1     Definitions
D Gross public debt
ND Net public debt
BG Gross borrowing
BO Gross borrowing, official (IMF, EU)
BPN Gross borrowing, new private
AMZ Amortization
GAP Financing gap
REF Reserve fund stock
PVZ Privatization








ri Interest rate, debt category i
INT Interest payments, net
Y GDP
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